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To commence the sta,utory
time for appeals as of right
(CPLR 5513[a]), you are
advised to serve a copy
of this order; with notice
of ~mtry, 'Upon all parties.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ORANGE
PRESENT: HON. LAWRENCE H. ECK.ER, J.S.C.
~-~-~--~-----:-----~-------~----:-------------~---~-~--~-~---)(

In the Matter of NEWLLY VELASQUEZ,
Petitioner,
-against-

Index No. 6271 /2011

DECISION, ORDER &
JUDGMENT

NEW YORK STATE BQARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent
i
-------~---~----:::::::-~:-~~----·~~ --~~-~~---~-)(
The following papers numbered 1 to 13 were read on petitioner's application
pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking an order annulling and vacating his denial of
parole and granting a new parole release hearing:

PAPERS NUMBERED

1-4
5-13

Order to Show Cause /P etition/ Exhibits 1-2
Answer and Return/E)(hibits 1-9

Upon the foregoing papers, the decision, order, and judgment of the court is as
follows:
'

Petitioner Newlly Velasquez ("Petitioner") seeks an order and judgment purs.uant
to CPLR Article 78 seeking the following relief: 1) annulling and vacating the

•,

September 15, 201'0 determination of respondent New Yotk State Board of Parol.e
denying him parole; and 2) directing petitioner's release to parole supervision, or
alternatively, granting a new parole hearing. Respondent opposes the petition and
seeks its dismissal.
On October 13, 1993, petitioner was convicted, upon his guilty plea, of murder in
the second degree in Supreme Court, Kings County and sentenced to an
indeterminate term of 17 years to life imprisonment. Additionally, on October 19, 1993,
he was re-sentenced, upon his admission to a violation of probation, upo'n a youthful
offender adjudication for attempted robbery in the fir.st degree, to ~n indeterminate term
of imprisonment of one and one-third to four (1/3 - 4) years, said sentences to run
consecutively.

In 1992, petitioner committed an attempted armed robbery with two others. He
pleaded guilty and was sentenced as a youthful offender to five years probatio"n with six
months imprisonment. Later that year, while on probation~ petitioner was involved in a
street fight and shot another man to death who was interceding to stop the fight.
Aftet serving 18 y~ars , petitioner became eligible for parole in January. 2011 ..He
appeared before the Board of Parole on September 15, 2010 at Otisville Correctional
Facility in Orange County. At this initial p~role hearing, the Board primarily questioned
.

.

petitioner about his crimes an~ past criminal history. Petitioner admitted to the crim~s
and expressed his remorse . Respond. Answer and Return, Exhibit 4.
Petitioner was de·nied parole and held for 24 months to September, 2012.
The Board's decision stated:
2

Parole is denied for the following reasons : After a careful
review of your record and t his interview, it is the determination
of t his panel that if released at this time there is a rec;tsonable
probabi li~y that you would not live and remain at liberty without
violating the law and your release at this time is incompatible
with the welfare and safety of the community. T his decision
is based upon the following factors: the seriousness nature
of the instant offense of Murder 2 and YO Attempted Robbery
involved you shooting the victim several times causing his def]th·.
In a separate incident you acting in concert pulled guns and
demanded money from the victim. Your actions clearly ·displayed
a propensity for extreme violence and a total disregard for
human life, You've incurred multiple disciplinary infractions
wh'ile incarcerated. Your positive programming is also noted.
However, all relevant factors considered, discretionary release is
inappropriate at th is time for the panel to hold otherwise would so
deprecate the seriousness of your crime as 1o undermine respect
for the law.

Petitioner took an administrative appeal from the Board's decision. On or about
May 26, 2011, the Board of Parole affirmed its decision denying parole.

Discussion
It is well settled that parole release is a discretiona!)' function of the Parole Board
and its determination should not be disturbed by the court unless it is shown that the
Board's decision is irrational "bordering on impropriety" and that the determination was;
thus, arbitrary and capricious. Matter of Salmon v. Travis, 95 N. Y 2d 470 (2000); Matter

of King v. N.S. Division of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1s1 Dept. , 1993), affd 83 N. Y.2d 788
.
.
.
(1994); Matter of Duffy v. f!.S. Div. Of Parole, 74 AD3d 965 (2d Dept 2010); Matter·of
Rios v. NS. Division of Parole, 15 Misc. 3cf 1107(A) (Sup. Ct., Kings Co., 2007). In
reviewing the Board's decision, the court must also examine whether the Board 's
discretion was properly exercised in accordance with the parole statute.
3

Executive Law §259-c[4] was ~ecently amended to require the Board to
promulgate new procedures in making parole release decisions. Such new procedures
"shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons
appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such persons upon release,
and assist members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be
released to parole supervision. " See, Laws of 2011 , ch. 62, Part C, Subpart A, §38~b.
The amendments to the parole statutes are remedial in nature arid designed to
modernize decision-making in the area of parole release. As one commentator noted:
The 2011 amendments ..... modernize the work of the
Parole Board by requiring the board to adopt proced ures
that incorporate a growing body of social science research
about. assessing post-release needs and recidivism risks.

* * * * *
[T]he most important change is the replacement of static,
past focused "guidelines" wit~ more dynamic present and
future-focused risk assessment "procedures" to guide the
Parole Board ...This addition of an explicit requirement that
the Parole ~oard adopt and be guided by procedures that
require it to evaluate "rehabilitation" and the likelihood of
success ... upon release" signals a critical reform and
modernization of parole practices. Such procedures .... will
rationalize parole decision-making by placing the focus
primarily on who the person appearing before the Parole
Board is tod~y and on whether that person can succeed
in the community after release, rather than - as .under the
previous "guidelines" - on who the person was many years
earlier when she or he committed the crime. This is a shift
of potentialJy sweeping significance.
1

Professor Phi.flip M. Genty, Colum~ia Law School, "Chan9es to Paro.le Laws Signal
Potentially Sweeping Policy Shift," NYLJ, September 1, 2011 :

In Matter of Thwaites v. N.S. Bd. Of Parole,_ Misc3d_:_, 2011WL6413855,

2011 NY Slip Op. 21453 (2011); this court held the above remedial amendment should

(

4

apply in a pending proceeding, and petitioner was entitled to a new parole hearing
consistent with the new risk assessment procedures.
It is axiomatic that remedial legislation should be given retroactive effect in order
to effectuate its beneficial purpose. Gleason v. Vee, 96 NY2d 117, 122 (2001);
Majewski v. Broada/bin-Petth Cent. School District, 91NY2d577 (1998); Beckerv.
Huss Co., 43 NY2d 527, 540 (1 978); see also, People
1100 (41h Dept 2010); Aguaiza

v.

ex rel.

Forshey v. John, 7_5 AD3d

Vantage Properlies, LLC, 69 AD3d 422 (1$f Dept

2010). Remedial statutes have been regarded as an exception to any general rule
against retroactivity. McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, §54.
Here, as in Thwaites , respondent relied almost entirely on the nature of
petitioner's crimes in denying parole. While his institutional and program
accomplishments were noted, the Board fooused on the circumstances of the crime
committed eighteen years ago. ·When the Board reasoned that petitioner's
discretionary release was inappropriate and incompatible with the welfare of the
community so as to deprecate the seriousness of the crim~ as to undermine the respect
for the law, it was employing pas_t-focused rhetoric, not future-focused risk assessment
analysis: Such reasons fail to sust~in a ratiC?nal determination on the inquiry at hand:
whether there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released , he will live and
remain
at liberty .without
violating
the law, and that his release is not. incompatible with
.
.
.
'

the welfare of society and will not deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to
undermine respect for the law. Executive Law §259-i[2][c].

/

(

/

5

'

In Matter of King v. N.S. Div. of Parole, supra, the court, in finding the Parole
Board's determination fundamentally flaw~d. stated, "The role of the Parole Board is not
to resentence petitioner, according to the personal opinions of its members as to the
appropriate penalty for murder, but to detemiine whether, as of this moment, given all of
the relevant statutory factors, he should be released." (emphas·is added)
Similarly, in Matter of Rios v. N.S. Division of Parole, 15 Misc. 3d 1107 (A), 2007

WL 846561 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co., 2007), the court stated:
"[t]his court, of cours_e, does not mean to minimize the seriousness of petitioner's
offense, nor the tragedy of the death of petitioner's victim[s), however in affording
the possibility of parole to those convicted of murder, the Legislature has made a
determination that, despite the seriousness of that crime, rehabilitation is
possible and desirable .......... certainly every murder conviction is inherently a
matter of the utmost seriousness since it reflects the unjustifiable taking and
tragic loss of a human life. Since, however, the Legislature has determined that a
murder ·conviction per. se should not preclude parole, there must be a showing of
some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime
itself, quoting Matter of King, supra, 190 A. D.2d at 433."
The court finds the Board's
decision denying parole in this case to be arbitrary
.
.
and capricious, irrational, and improper based upon the Parol.e Board's failure to
art.iculate any rational, nonconclusory basis, other than its reliance on the seriousness
of the crime as to why the Board_could not believe "there is a reasonable probability that
if petitioner is released, he would live and relT)ain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfar~ of society and will not so deprecate

.

.

the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law." Executive Law §259i[2][cJ. If is undisputed the Board's decision was not ·made in accordance with the
subsequeht 2011 Amendments to the Executive Law which require a new parole
hearing utilizing risk assessment principles and procedures.
6

Accordingly, the court grants th~ petition, annuls the Board of Parole's
determination of September 15, 201 0, vacates the denial of parole re lea s ~ to petitioner,
a·n d remands to the Board of Parole which, within 30 days of the service of a copy of
this order with notice of entry, shall hold a new parole hearing consistent with this
decision and the mandates of Executive Law §259-c and §259-1, as amended by Laws
.
.
of 2011, .ch. 62. The new hearing shall be held before a different panel of the Parole
Board.
The foregoing constitutes the decision, order, and judgment of the court.

Dated: Goshen, New York
January 26, 2012

· H

cc: Newlly Velasquez
93-A-8280
Otisville Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 8
Otisville, New York 10963
Jeane L. Strickland Smith, Esq.
Assistant Attorn.ey General
New York State Attorney General's Office
Attorney for Respondent ·
One Civic Center Plaza, Suite 401
Poughkeepsie, New York 12601

7

